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IN

The Supreme Court
OF THE

State of Utah
CLARABELL !(ELLEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
SALT LAK:E TRA~SPORTATION
COMPANY, a corporation;
GREEN CAB TRANSPORTATION CO:JIP ANY, a corporation; and LEWIS BARTLEY,

Case No. 6329

Defendants and AppellantE·.

REPLY BRIEF OF DEFEND..Z\.NTS AND
APPELLANTS
No dispute exists as to the facts involved, nor with
respect to the questions presented for determination.
The difference of vievv has reference solely to the law
applicable to the particular circumstances of this case.

I.

The Question of Negligence

The first question considered by both appellants and
respondent is the sufficiency of the evidence on the quPsSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion of negligence to make a case for the jury, or to sustain the verdict of the jury.
Respondent contends (Brief, page 5) tha:t there was
a conflict in the evidence on the question of speed which
made that a fact to be determined by the jury. Respondent alleged in her complaint, as ·an act of negligence on
the part of appellants, that the cab in which she was riding was traveling at a rate of speed in excess of 35 miles
per hour at the time the brakes were applied and the
cab brought to a stop. She testified (Tr. 48, Ab. 14)
that the cab was going about 25 or 30 miles per hour;
that {Tr. 56, Ab. 16) she had never driven a car; that
the car which dashed up in front of the cab was going faster than the cab. The witness Bartley testified
that the cab was going from 20 to 22 miles an hour (Tr.
102, Ab. 27). It is true the witnesses differ as to how
fast the cab was going, but this is of no consequence and
presents no proper issue of fact to be determined by the
jury. There is no state law, and no city ordinance
is pleaded, nor are any facts pleaded, which make a speed
of 25 miles per hour a negligent or careless speed at the
time and place in question.
There is no evidence from which even a presumption can be drawn that the speed involved was negligent,
or caused the damage complained of, unless we draw
that presumption from the sole fact that the plaintiff fell off the seat, and this is in fact the presumption which respondent relies upon, (See Brief, page
6). We think it is beyond dispute that the fact of the hapSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pening of the accident is no proof of negligence, nor even
the basis of a presumption in this case, because (a) the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not pleaded Loos v.
Jlountain Fu.el Supply Company, ) ........ Utah ______ , 108 Pac.
(2d) :254, at page 259); and (b) because even if it had
been pleaded, it would not be applicable in a case where
the other facilities involved, such as an approaching car,
were not under the control of the defendant, (Yellow Cab
Company v. Hodson, et al (Colo.), 14 Pac. (2d) 1081).
Respondent further contends that the jury had a
right to indulge in a presumption, from the facts surrounding the incident, that the driver 'vas not keeping a
proper or any lookout (Brief, page 5). This is another
effort to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which,
for the reasons shown, may not be done in this case.
However, even if the jury were permitted to draw
from the fact that the accident occurred, an inference
or presumption that the driver was not keeping a proper
or any lookout, r.ny such inference or presumption would
immediately disappear in the face of positive and undisputed evidence that a careful ·watch and lookout war, kept.
See the evidence of Bartley (Tr. 101, Ab. 26) that he
looked both right and left; that two cars had proceeded
through the intersection immediately in front of him,
and that the car approaching from the left did not show
up until there was nothing to do but apply his brakes and
stop to avoid a collision. A presumption is not evidence,
and has no weight as such, but only determines the
party who has the duty of going fonYard with the eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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dence, and when that duty is met by the production of
evidence, the presumption becomes inoperative. Annotation :95 A. L. R. 881. Professor Wigmore in his work on
Evidence, 2nd Ed. Sec. 2491, says :
"It is, therefore, a fallacy to attribute (as
do some judges) an artificial probative force to a
presumption, increasing for the jury the weight of
the facts, even when the opponent has come forward with some evidence to the contrary."
Our Court has followed this view, State v. Gre.en,
78 Utah 580, 6 Pac. (2) 177, and in Buckley v. Francis,
78 Utah 606, 6 Pac. (2d) 188, and in other cases. It has
been stated that a presumption is ''a mere house of cards,
which one moment stands with sufficient force to determine an issue, but at the next by reason of the slightest
rebutting evidence, topples utterly out of consideration
of the tryer of facts," Jones on Evidence, 2nd Edition,
Sec. 32.
In this case, therefore, where the rebutting evidence
of keeping a proper lookout (Tr. 101, Ab. 26) and retarding the speed of the cab as it entered the intersection (Tr. 101, Ab. 2·6) is complete and undisputed, there
can be no recourse to presumptions or inferences, nor can
there be any left-handed application of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, in view of the repeated decisions of our
court on that point.
The cases cited by respondent under this point, on
pages 2 and 3 of her brief, state general rules of law
applicable to proper facts and particularly applicable to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
the facts in those cases which were entirely different and
bear no analogy to the facts presented here.

ll. The Release
Appellants, by their opening brief (pp. 19-22), have
raised the question as to "~hether or not respondent has,
by her Reply, pleaded facts sufficient to avoid the releas·e
set up in appellants' ·answer. This point was preserved
by motions for non-suit and directed verdict, and by appropriate assignments of error. Respondent's brief
makes no reference to this aspect of the case.
This plea attempting to avoid the release for fraud
lacks such essential elements as (a) that the representations were false; (b) tha:t they were known to be false
by the person making them or that they were made with
the intention that they should be acted upon by plaintiff.
The authorities (appellants' opening brief, (pp. 1922) appear to hold that a plea in avoidance of a release
for fraud must contain all the essential elements of a
cause of action for false representation. Indeed, the
case of Bennett, et ux. v. Deaton (Idaho), 68 Pac. (2d)
895, principally relied upon by the respondent, confirms
this view of the law. In that case as sho·wn at page 899
of the report referred to, and at page 13 of respondent's
brief, the Court citing with approval the holding in
lf!oods v. Wikstrom (Ore.), 135 P.192, said:
" 'If the defendant represented to the plaintiff, in order to prevail on him to execute the release, that the accident was unavoidable, and that
he had no cause of action against him, w :tlwut
beliering said representation to be true, and the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plaintiff believed said representations, and, so believing, executed the release, such representations
constituted fraud and vitiated said release, if the
representations were false.' . . . " (Italics ours.)
At several points in respondent's brief it is stated
that the consideration paid for the release was inadequate. The statements of fact made on this point are
not, in every instance, complete nor accurate. See respondent's brief, page 11, where it is said, "particularly
is this true when the amount paid in exchange for the
release is so inadequate, as the evidence shows in this
case that the $20.00 would not pay the expenseR incurred for independent medical services and for hired
help.'' At other places in respondent's brief, the true
facts are shown which are these: that in exchange for
the release, respondent was to receive not only the sum
of $20.00 to pay the expense of household help, but, also
appellants were to pay all bills theretofore incurred by
respondent for medical service, and to pay for such additional medical attention as she might require. See the
testimony of :Mr. Boynton (Tr. 119, Ab. 30):
"
. I told her that we would pay all
doctor bills that she had so far incurred, her doctor and the one that we had advised, and that we
would further pay doctor bills as long as she was
under the treatment of Dr. Spencer \Vright if
she would go to him and take treatments until he
released her. . . . ' '
and see again (Tr. 129, Ab. 32):
"The proposition . . . in consideration
of which the release was signed v,·as not only the
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$20.000 but the payment of all past doctor bills
and futurf' medical serYice.''
There is no rlaim in the pleadings of inadequacy
of consideration, nor any claim of duress or undue influence, nor was there any such factor in truth involved.
The record does not indicate that plaintiff's net recovery
from the a,,-ard made her by the jury would exceed the
amount of past and future doctor bills, and the cash
payment made her by appellants. In view of the issues
framed by the pleadings, respondent's present suggestion of inadequacy of consideration is inappropriate.
In connection with the argument just referred to,
respondent cites Dovich v. Chief Consolidated Mining
Co., 53 Utah 522, at page 535, where the Court says:
"Settlements of damage cases between employers and employees are to be encouraged, but
disingenuousness and unfairness on the part of
either are reprehensible." (Italics ours.)
A mere reading of the excerpt cited by respondent
shows that the rule there laid down has no relevancy to
the case at bar where no employer-employee relationship
is involved and upon reading that case in full, \Ve discover that Dovich was induced to sign a release without
knowing that he was doing so, and upon the belief that
he was signing a paper to get his insurance. On the contrary, in the case at bar, the respondent knew what she
was signing, knew what she was to receive, and had independent advice.
There is one other point raised by rrspondent 's brief
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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under this caption which requires consideration. The
principal misrepresentation complained of is that agents
of the defendants stated to the plaintiff that she would
not be able to recover against the defendants for her
injuries. Mrs. Kelley's evidence (Tr. 52-65, Ab. 16-18)
was that Mr. Boynton told her that it didn't matter
whether she employed an attorney or not, that she
could not get more than they were offering her. Mr.
Boynton testified (Tr. 126, Ab. 31) that he told Mrs.
Kelly the defendants did not consider themselves liable
for anything; that he told her in the presence of her
hrother, Mr. Utley, that what they were offering ·was
all they were vdlling to pay. Do these statements
amount to misrepres-entations sufficient to avoid a release executed ten days after the accident happened, under circumstances where plaintiff's brother had invited
defendants out to make an adjustment, and the adjustment was made with respondent on the independent advice of her brother, and after due deliveration ~ If so,
then the rule that releases and adjustments are to he
encouraged, must be reversed.
Respondent endeavors, in her brief, to fasten upon
the point that Mr. Boynton and :Mr. Jennings, who came
out to s·ee her, ·were expert adjustors, skilled in the law
of liability for personal injuries, and that they took advantage of her. There is no proof of any such claim in
the record and certainly none for the statement made
at the top of page 11 of respondent's brief that these individuals had adjusted many cases arising out of injur-
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ies to patrons of taxicab companies, and that they were in
the category of experts, such as claim agents and claim
adjustors.
nir. Boynton testified (Tr. 123, Ab. 31) that he took
::\Ir. Jennings out with him so that Mr. Jennings would
be present at the conversation; that Mr. Utley, plaintiff's
brother, had called that day and said that they were
ready to talk final settlement; that defendants were
interested in making a settlement to save legal expense.
\Ve have re-checked the record in an effort to find any
evidence supporting the contention that Mr. Boynton and
Mr. Jennings were expert adjustors, or represented themselves to be such, or that they had or claimed to have
any knowledge of the law applicable to the facts, and
we can find none. \V e respectfully submit that there is
neither a sufficient pleading, nor any evidence in the
record, adequate to avoid the effect of the release shown.

m.

Instructions

Respondent makes no serious effort to justify the
refusal of the Court to give defendants' requested Instruction No. 6 This request was as follows, (Tr. lAO,
Ab. 42):
''The defendants request the Court to instruct
the jury that if the jury finds that the defendants
did in fact state to the plaintiff that they were
not liable, and she could not recover, then the
jury should further determine whether such expression of opinion was honestly entertained and
honestly made, and if the jury finds that such exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
pressions of opinion were made and were honestly
entertained, then the Court instructs the jury that
the expression of such opinion would not constitute misrepresentation, and that the release could
not be avoided on that ground."
At page 20 of her brief, respondent says, in effect,
that the Court's refusal to give defendants' requested
Instruction No. 6 was justified by the same reason which
justified the refusal to give request No. 5. A mere reading of the pleadings and the two instructions will show
that they have no relation to each other. Requested Instruction No. 6 was asked upon the theory that a representation honestly entertained and honestly, even though
mistakenly, made cannot be such a false representation
of as will avoid a contract. It would seem that this view
is incontestable. vVe refer the Court again to the cases
cited in our opening brief at page 36, and add thereto the
citation from Bennett, et ux v. Deaton, et al, 68 Pac. (2d)
895, as set out at page 13 of respondent's brief, which
reads as follows:
" 'If the defendant represented to the plaintiff, in order to prevail on him to execute the release, that the accident was unavoidable, and that
he had no cause of action against him, without
believing said representations to be true, and the
plaintiff believed said representations, and, so believing, executed the release, such representations
constituted fraud and vitiated said release, if the
representations were false.' '' (Italics ours.)
There is no evidence that the statements made in
this case were made either carelessly or negligently, or
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without belief in their truth. The contrary clearly
appears. In any event, if the ease was to have been
submitted to the jury at all, appellants were entitled to
an instruction upon this vital point.
As to the remainder of the objections to instructions given and requests refused, the appellants rest
their case upon the arguments set forth in their principal
brief.
Respectfully submitted,
INGEBRETSEN, RAY, RAWLINS,
and CHRISTENSEN,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

